

COPYRIGHT NOTICE
DeLoughrey/Routes and Roots

is published by University of Hawai'i Press and copyrighted, © 2007, by University of Hawai'i Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher, except for reading and browsing via the World Wide Web. Users are not permitted to mount this file on any network servers.

INTRODUCTION

Tidialectics

Navigating Repeating Islands

I am the supple rhythm of the seas;
I recreate the world on islands.

—Eric Roach, “The World of Islands”

In the poem from which this epigraph is drawn, Tobagonian writer Eric Roach inscribes “a shoal of sea-beleaguered lands” bequeathed to the contemporary Caribbean subject. They are “difficult . . . to inherit” due to their violent history of colonization and their complex layering of native and diaspora populations. For Roach, the islands are a space where “indigenous blood still stains the grass,” signifying the corporal residue of history, its localization and merger with natural space, and the landscape’s propensity to absorb and reflect human history. “Those whom bondage bit to bone” are legible for historical recuperation because their artistic abilities transform this “flowering rock” of an island into song, prayer, dance, and music. The speaker quoted in the epigraph emerges in the last few lines; she represents the region as a dancer whose castanet is the moon, a “phoenix Eve” who feminizes the Adamic myth of island origins. She speaks of the Caribbean’s creolization of cultures in fluid and intoxicating terms, as “the mingled wine of the world’s grapes” and, by extension, the product of breakage and reassembly. After establishing this Mediterranean connection, the poem concludes with the lines of the epigraph, a testimony to the natural rhythm of the sea, the cycle of regeneration after unspeakable violence, the oceanic origins of islands and their metonymic worldliness. Roach’s dense layering of geology and human history is cyclical; the tidal rhythm of the sea generates islands, just as the flows of maritime trade and transoceanic diaspora “recreate the world on islands.” In turn, “the world on islands” suggests that each isle might be read metonymically as the globe. Building on the title, we might conclude that this poem reflects “The world of islands” as much as it represents the *worldliness* of islands (Roach 1992, 147).

I have chosen Roach’s poem to open this book on comparative island literatures because it synthesizes the complex relationship between geography and history, the insular and the global, and routes and roots. The poem

INTRODUCTION

2

foregrounds our own location on a terraqueous globe, a watery planet that renders all landmasses into islands surrounded by the sea. Nevertheless, we maintain a cartographic hierarchy of space; our cognitive maps do not chart a shared islandness across the globe. Assumptions about size, location, history, and political importance seem to determine how island spaces are mapped so that we are more likely to perceive the islandness of Jamaica than, say, Iceland. Although islands are scattered all over the globe, the spaces that signify as islands are generally the small landmasses close to the equator, lands associated with tropical fertility, former colonies and outposts of empire that are deemed remote, exotic, and isolated by their continental visitors. By recognizing this often arbitrary division between islands and continents, we can pinpoint how geography has been used to uphold a series of cultural and political assumptions. This book seeks to complicate the ways in which certain island spaces have been deemed ahistorical and isolated by foregrounding how the process of colonization has relegated these spaces into museums or laboratories for tourism, anthropological inquiry, or sociological praxis. One of the central but unacknowledged ways in which European colonialism has constructed the trope of the isolated island is by mystifying the importance of the sea and the migrations across its expanse. In order to recuperate the centrality of the ocean in island discourse, I turn to Kamau Brathwaite's theory of "tidalectics," a methodological tool that foregrounds how a dynamic model of geography can elucidate island history and cultural production, providing the framework for exploring the complex and shifting entanglement between sea and land, diaspora and indigeneity, and routes and roots.

What is to be gained from a comparative literature project that highlights the intersections between space and time, place and history? Tidalectics engage what Brathwaite calls an "alter/native" historiography to linear models of colonial progress. This "tidal dialectic" resists the synthesizing telos of Hegel's dialectic by drawing from a cyclical model, invoking the continual movement and rhythm of the ocean. Tidalectics also foreground alter/native epistemologies to western colonialism and its linear and materialist biases.¹ As a geopoetic model of history, Brathwaite images the ongoing and palpable heritage of "submerged mothers" who cross the seas, "coming from one continent/continuum, touching another, and then receding . . . from the island(s) into the perhaps creative chaos of the(ir) future" (1999, 34). I build upon this feminized vision of history to destabilize the myth of island isolation and to engage the island as a world as well as the worldliness of islands. I interpret tidalectics as a dynamic and

shifting relationship between land and sea that allows island literatures to be engaged in their spatial and historical complexity.

The title of this book, *Routes and Roots*, employs these homonyms in relation to the tidalectic between sea and land. The subtitle employs the term “navigation” to emphasize the role of islander agency in terms of “charting” and “steering” a course and to highlight the role of nonwestern epistemologies of time-space. In fact, Brathwaite’s vision of fluid time-space has much in common with the Pacific wayfinding system of moving islands, termed “etak” in the Caroline Islands of Micronesia. As scholars such as David Lewis and Vicente Diaz have explained, Pacific models of ocean navigation differ from western paradigms because they do not flatten and stabilize space through the bird’s eye view of nautical charts. Instead, Pacific navigators have developed a complex system of charting a vessel’s movement through space where the voyaging canoe is perceived as stable while the islands and cosmos move towards the traveler. “Etak is a polydimensional system that involves both direction and time, and therefore movement. The etak conception of moving islands is an essentially dynamic one” (Lewis 1994, 184). This concept of moving islands has provided an innovative model of approaching the intersections of indigenous and cultural studies (see Diaz and Kauanui 2001). In contradistinction to western models of passive and empty space such as *terra* and *aqua nullius*, which were used to justify territorial expansion, the interlinked concepts of tidalectics and moving islands foreground alter/native models of reckoning space and time that require an active and participatory engagement with the island seascape. An emphasis on maritime vessels foregrounds their contributions to the formation of island history. Postcolonial seafaring is invoked here as a practice and as a metaphor for navigating a course that is not over-determined by the trajectories of western colonization. Attention to movement offers a paradigm of rooted routes, of a mobile, flexible, and voyaging subject who is not physically or culturally circumscribed by the terrestrial boundaries of island space.

In an effort to position island cultures in the world historical process, I examine how these methodologies of charting transoceanic migration and landfall help elucidate the ways in which theories and peoples travel on a global scale. The rationale for this mode of inter-island comparison is to move beyond restrictive national, colonial, and regional frameworks and to foreground shared histories, particularly as they are shaped by geography. Both etak and tidalectics offer an interdisciplinary approach that places contemporary islands in a dialogue with each other as well as their

INTRODUCTION

continental counterparts. In fact, as I will explain, these tropical island cultures have helped constitute the very metropoles that have deemed them peripheral to modernity.

As the first comparative study of Caribbean and Pacific Island literatures in English, this book takes geography as a starting point to argue that the land/sea relationship has been conducive to complex patterns of migration and settlement, creating literatures of diaspora and indigeneity that complicate the colonial vision of isolated tropical isles. Like Brathwaite, Édouard Glissant reminds us that the “island embodies openness. The dialectic between inside and outside is reflected in the relationship of land and sea” (1989, 139).² This “openness” reflects a tialectic between routes and roots, a methodology of reading island literatures that structures this book. Thus the first section examines the literature of maritime routes and what I term the “transoceanic imaginary,”³ exploring Derek Walcott’s maxim that the “the sea is history.” The second section turns to the land in order to excavate native roots in nation-building literatures. Both sections are particularly attentive to the ways in which the metaphors of routes and roots are gendered, offering a critique of how masculine travelers are naturalized in their voyages across feminized lands and seas. Overall, the comparative frame of *Routes and Roots* navigates uncharted spaces in post-colonial studies, a field that has not adequately addressed the ways in which indigenous discourses of landfall have mitigated and contested productions of transoceanic diaspora.

Most comparative literature projects demarcate their epistemological boundaries through the concept of national difference; this enables scholars to speak of shared history, language, religion, and cultural mores that are bounded by the modern nation state. As a postcolonial study of two regions that cannot be contained by the organizing parameters of one shared language, one colonial history, or one dominant nation-state (or even post-colonial status), *Routes and Roots* shifts the discourse to the concept of the island region and, by extension, problematizes national frameworks. As such, it is a project informed by the contemporary trajectories of migration and globalization. While the focus here is generally anglophone, the complexity of the migration of peoples and texts to and from diverse English-speaking metropoles has necessarily demanded a new paradigm to justify the comparison of such large regions. Diaspora studies has provided a vital and innovative framework for transnational comparison and has been a central influence on this work, but its tendency to focus on a particular ethnic group of (male) travelers limits its applicability. In fact, here I want

to complicate diaspora theory's substitution of a national framework by an ethnic or racial one.

One of the larger objectives of this book is to examine the ways in which regionalism and diaspora studies, while they seem to offer the potential to dismantle the gendered, ethnic, and class hierarchies of the state, often inscribe remarkably analogous structures. Scholars have pointed out the ways in which privileged masculine subjects imagine citizenship by invoking feminized metaphors of the nation that preclude women's active participation, yet there is a strikingly similar gendering of diaspora. Like the operative metaphors of national belonging that encode a semantic collapse between women and (mother)land, diasporic discourses often position masculine subjects as normative travelers who rely upon a feminized sea in order to imaginatively regenerate across time and space. This is why, in the language of diaspora and globalization, masculinized trajectories of nomadic subjects and capital attain their motility by invoking feminized flows, fluidity, and circulation, while the feminine (as an organizing concept) and women (as subjects) are profoundly localized. To be localized in this case does not operate with the ideological potential of the dictum "think globally, act locally," but rather registers as symbolic and physical stasis. We have only to turn to Michel Foucault's gloss on Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* to recognize the pervasiveness of these gendered celebrations of travel. He writes, "Prefer what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over unities, mobile arrangements over systems. *Believe that what is productive is not sedentary but nomadic*" (1972, my emphasis xiii). In a remarkable appropriation of the very terms with which women's bodies are associated and theorized—difference, multiplicity, production, and flows—the masculine nomad achieves mobility precisely through the erasure of women's corporeal, ontological, and economic capacity for (re)production. Since the model of (masculine) diaspora has increasingly become a stand-in for the postcolonial predicament, it is all the more important to insist on tracing its points of erasure, particularly its neglect of indigenous studies, which has an entirely different relationship to the history of land, nation-building, and the nation-state. This tension between (feminized) histories of diaspora and indigeneity is explored through the tialectics of routes and roots.

The broad comparative nature of this book demands an engagement with multiple disciplines, and while it is deeply informed by postcolonial studies, the breadth of the project means that it cannot be categorized easily under a postcolonial rubric. The Caribbean and Pacific Islands do not

INTRODUCTION

fit neatly into a postcolonial paradigm because they do not share simultaneous colonial histories even though they have been (and still are) occupied at different points by Christian, Spanish, French, British, and American capitalist empires. In fact the continuity of indigenous presence in the Pacific when contrasted with the decimation of native cultures in the Caribbean is a testament to the radical historical differences of colonialism in each region. Indigenous activists in the Pacific have pointed towards the epistemic erasures implicit in the linear definitions of the “post” of postcolonialism as they struggle with the ongoing inequities in white-settler states. And while the political methodologies of native sovereignty movements may not suit the Caribbean’s celebration of creolized and composite cultures, the transnational thrust of diaspora theory often poses a profound epistemological challenge to the localizing focus of indigeneity. These challenges to any homogenizing framework of comparison point to the need for a dynamic methodology that engages the intersections of time-space without fixing or freezing either. Thus tidalectics foreground three key ideas: how both regions share a complex history of migration patterns before and after colonization; how the island *topos* entails an exchange between land and sea that translates into the discourse of “ex-isles” and settlement; and finally, how these vital links between geography, history, and cultural production facilitate a reading of island literatures. This emphasis on geography is not environmentally determinist because it encodes an active, participatory ecology. As the *etak* or moving-islands model demonstrates, the landscape participates in the historical process, resisting the synthesizing narrative of conquest. It is by insisting on the tidalectics between land and sea and by remapping the Caribbean and Pacific alongside each other that particular discourses of diaspora, indigeneity, and sovereignty can be examined in ways that challenge and complement each other, foregrounding the need for simultaneous attention to maritime routes and native roots.

Navigating Repeating Islands

To understand the contemporary literary production of the Caribbean and Pacific, one must engage with the long colonial history of mapping island spaces. Although it has not attracted much attention in postcolonial studies, the desire for islands—“nesomania” in James Michener’s words (quoted in Day 1987, 1)—was a trademark of European maritime empires. Countless explorers directed their efforts towards the discovery of the “Antilles”; utopian counter-lands or ante-islands that, in my reading, offer a deeper historical model for what Antonio Benítez-Rojo refers to as the “repeating

island" (1992). Benítez-Rojo has famously employed chaos theory to imagine the fractal expansion of the culture of the Caribbean across the globe, transported by contemporary migrants. As helpful as his theory of repeating islands is for a positive and creative vision of diaspora and resettlement, I want to place it in juxtaposition to older and more pernicious models of colonial island expansion.

By turning to the "root" or originary island of what would become a global anglophone island empire, we see that England's claim to islandness, a suppression of Wales and Scotland, derives from the political establishment of the United Kingdom and its subsequent colonial expansion overseas. England constituted itself as an island by its expansion into the territory of its immediate neighbors and, as many have demonstrated, constructed its earliest formulations of racial difference through the colonization of its first island colony, Ireland. Consequent to a long history of colonial practice, the cultural topography once associated with imperial England (its isolation from continental Europe) then becomes projected onto *other* island spaces that are reformulated as remote and isolated only in relation to the geographies of industrialized Great Britain.⁴ This enabled the argument that England's limited terrestrial space justified its need for island colonies, visible in nineteenth-century British Colonial Secretary C. S. Adderley's assertion that "this little island wants not energy, but only territory and basis to extend itself; its sea-girt home would then become the citadel of one of the greatest of the empires" (quoted in Hyam 1993, 2). Here Britain is articulated as an expanding isle as it extends its insular geography through global empire-building. The tension between the contained English isle and its propensity to expand outwards by maritime rule draws attention to how conceptions of limited island space were vital to "spawning" an Anglo-Saxon diaspora into colonial territories. Although the population of England (and the rest of Europe) did greatly expand due to the availability of food crops and labor resources from the colonies, the *limitations* of island space were not the problem so much as the inequitable distribution of territory, the result of an emergent capitalism that turned the terrestrial commons into private property. Thus, England's "island story," a narrative of invasion and settlement, is transformed from a space of received colonists (early Anglo-Saxon invaders) to a bounded sovereign entity that refuses migrants while propelling its people outwards to people its island colonies.⁵ Over the centuries Great Britain is discursively refashioned as a repeating island throughout its colonies in the Caribbean and Pacific, as suggested by the toponyms New Albion, New Britain, New Hebrides, New Ireland, and "Little England," or Barbados.

INTRODUCTION

The notion of the isolated island has material and metaphorical meanings derived from a complex history of European expansion into contained spaces. This repeating-island story arose from early experiments in deforestation, colonization, enslavement, and plantation monoculture, which were first tested in the eastern Atlantic islands. Demonstrating how island space functioned as a laboratory, Alfred Crosby concludes that European experiments in the Canaries and Madeira taught colonists that they must seek lands that were: (1) remote enough to discourage the epidemiological susceptibility of Europeans; (2) distant enough to minimize the islanders' defense against western diseases; (3) isolated from large mammals such as horses to ensure colonial military advantage; and finally, (4) lands uninhabited by maritime peoples (1986, 102). In the grammar of empire, *remoteness* and *isolation* function as synonyms for island space and were considered vital to successful colonization. Although all islands are isolated by etymological definition, their remoteness has been greatly exaggerated by trans-oceanic visitors. The myth of the remote isle derives from an amplification of the nautical technologies of the arrivant and an erasure of islanders' maritime histories. As Greg Dening reminds us, "Every living thing on an island has been a traveller. Every species of tree, plant, and animal on an island has crossed the beach" (1980, 31).

European experiments in the eastern Atlantic archipelagoes coupled with ancient European narratives of mythic islands contributed greatly to the later (re)construction and settlement of the Caribbean and Pacific Islands and a discursive refashioning of their isolation. This model of isolation has led to some strange observations about island space and cultures. For instance, French philosopher Charles de Montesquieu, writing at the height of European expansion, determined that "the inhabitants of islands have a higher relish for liberty than those of the continent . . . the sea separates them from great empires" (1748, Book XVIII). Although the French Navy was by then developing a global empire of overseas colonies from the Caribbean to the Indian Ocean and would soon be claiming territories in the Pacific, Montesquieu argued that "conquerors are stopped by the sea" (Book XVIII). In fact, islands were especially sought for colonization by all of the major maritime powers because their strategic positioning was vital to the flow of maritime traffic, their long coastlines provided multiple access points for trade and defense, they provided necessary stopover points for the refitting and the restocking of ships, and their contained spaces facilitated greater control of colonized and enslaved populations who, without access to maritime vessels, were less likely to escape (see Grove 1995, 63). The fact that islands and their inhabitants are positioned as remote and

isolated belies their centrality to world trade and their consistent visitation by colonials, missionaries, shipwreck, anthropology, and tourism. In effect, the narrative of island isolation is dependent upon these visitors. Popular U.S. television shows and films such as *Survivor*, *Lost*, and *The Beach* continue to capitalize upon the myth of the isolated tropical island, as does the tourist industry. Not surprisingly, there are few if any historical testimonies from Pacific or Caribbean Islanders bemoaning their distance from Europe.

Paradoxically, the island of colonial discourse is simultaneously positioned as isolated yet deeply susceptible to migration and settlement. The construction of isolated island space is an implicit consequence of European colonialism and has a tremendously complex history. The island has functioned in various historical eras as a new Eden, a sociopolitical utopia, a refreshment stop for long maritime journeys, and the contained space where shipwrecked men (or boys) may reconstruct their metropolitan homes. The archipelagoes of the Canary and Madeira islands were the first laboratories for European maritime imperialism and the first sugar plantations of the Atlantic. This experiment in island colonization, deforestation, plantocracy, and slavery was then repeated throughout the Caribbean. The use of one archipelago as an ideological and social template for the next reveals the ways in which the colonial discourse of islands repeated itself, rhizomatically, along a westward trajectory. For example, the eastern Atlantic islands were not only the first laboratories of empire, but also an important cartographic point that caused Christopher Columbus to situate his “discovery” of the West Indies as “off the Canary Islands” (1992, 16). This cognitive mapping is rendered materially visible when we remember that Columbus picked up sugar cane there and transplanted it to the Caribbean.

Tropical islands have not only functioned as colonial or sociopolitical laboratories of experiment, but they have facilitated tremendous ecological, anthropological, and biological theories. As Richard Grove has documented, islands provided the material bases for the establishment of the natural sciences, and the first scientific academies and botanical gardens of Europeans were founded in island colonies. Moreover, European deforestation of the Canary and Caribbean islands positioned these spaces as laboratories for the study of global climate and ecology; the colonial devastation of natural resources created the first environmental conservation laws of Spain, Britain, and France (1995, 6). The European colonization of archipelagoes across the planet was crucial to facilitating Alfred Wallace and Charles Darwin’s separate voyages around the world. Their

INTRODUCTION

10

independent observations of island flora and fauna enabled both men to establish the theory of species origins, adaptation, and evolution. Building upon the long narrative tradition of depicting islands as social and ecological utopias, Jean-Jacques Rousseau turned to the Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and Pacific Islands to construct his vision of the *homme naturel*.⁶ The island cultures of the Caribbean (and later the Pacific) were some of the earliest sites of western ethnography. Both island regions provided European observers with a space to theorize racial purity and difference, as they do to this day; contemporary theories of creolization derive from the contained spaces of the Caribbean just as ideas about indigeneity continue to be developed and contested in the Pacific. Alfred Wegener's theory of continental drift was made possible by the study of island flora and fauna (Nunn 1994, 22). Island topographies, labor, and resources have not only materially benefited Europe (such as the sugar plantations), but have provided the botanical, anthropological, biological, environmental, and ideological space for European laboratories, experiment, and development. The trope of island refreshment, fecundity, and exoticism would be repeated throughout Pacific Island visitation, and finds its contemporary manifestation in tourism discourse.⁷ In fact, the colonial era provided the ideological template for contemporary tourist consumption of island resources. Both forces overlap in their mutual construction of these spaces as remote and isolated, mystifying the islands' contributions to modernity. As Marshall Sahlins explains, "The heretofore obscure histories of remote islands deserve a place alongside the self-contemplation of the European past—or the history of 'civilizations' for their own remarkable contributions to an historical understanding" (1985, 72).

I have given this broad sketch of colonial island representation to suggest that those spaces deemed the most external to the march of world history may be its sources of production. This offers us a deeper understanding about the almost compulsive nature of the repeating-island story, its Mediterranean roots, and how, to draw from Peter Hulme, one "ideological discourse comes into existence through a process of tactical adaptation of earlier discourses" (1981, 56). For example, just after Columbus's return from his first voyage, an eighth-century legend reemerged in Europe that detailed the exodus of seven bishops from Lisbon to an uncharted Atlantic island where they erected a Christian utopia. Significantly, this island was called "Antillia," the counter-island, and frequently appeared on pre-Columbian maps. Antillia signifies the circulation of island myths across Europe and suggest a discursive construction of predetermined islands that were literally mapped before they were found. This island myth was

well known to Columbus; before he departed on his first transatlantic voyage, the astronomer Paolo dal Pozzo Toscanelli recommended Antillia as a stopover on the way to Cathay. This represents a slippage between the nonspace of “utopia” to an idealistic space of expectation—“eutopia”—that would be incorporated into Medieval and Renaissance cartography. This “Columbian hermeneutics of discovery” (Zamora 1993, 136) is articulated in Brathwaite’s poem “The Emigrants.” The Caribbean speaker observes: “Columbus from his after-/deck watched heights he hoped for/rocks he dreamed, rise solid from my simple water.” The speaker asks:

What did this journey mean, this
new world mean: dis-
covery? Or a return to terrors
he had sailed from, known before? (1973, 52)

In this dream vision of rocks that emerge from the ocean, Brathwaite, like Roach, invokes a cyclical notion of time and a dynamic model of generative space. The tautological nature of his “dis-/covery” is rhetorically articulated through the consonance of the navigator’s “return to terror.” Historians have argued that to Columbus, discovery meant finding what was “known before”; this cyclical conception of time might be connected to the legends circulating amidst Europeans that anticipated island landfall on the westward passage to “the Indies.”⁸ Since Marco Polo’s narrative had already described great archipelagoes in Asia, Columbus’s arrival to the Caribbean seemed to have been predestined in a collapse of time-space between Antillian and Asian islands. This is evident in cartographic representations that erase the Americas so that the Atlantic Ocean merges with the Pacific. This conflation of time and space is strikingly apparent in Columbus’s dual name for the Caribbean as the “West Indies” (Pacific) and the “Antilles” (Atlantic). Although it was less geographic confusion than an ideological one, Daniel Defoe’s conflation of a Pacific island (Juan Fernandez) with a Caribbean one (Tobago) led to a confused geographical setting for *Robinson Crusoe* (see Grove 1995, 227). Of course, neither could have known that geologically speaking, the Caribbean region did arise out of the Pacific, the world’s originary ocean. These moving and repeating islands then “emerged” in the toponyms of empire: thus we have the Virgin Islands (from the European legend of St. Ursula), Brazil (an Irish island legend), and Tahiti’s reformulation as the island of Aphrodite, or Nouvelle Cyth  re.⁹

In contrast to the notion that islands represent fixed, static spaces, these repeating-island stories highlight how island constructions traveled with

INTRODUCTION

European migration and voyaging. While St. Ursula's islands and Antillia became cartographically fixed by Columbus in the Caribbean, other imagined islands like the Antipodes (*Terra Australis Incognita*) moved westward, out of the Atlantic region into the Pacific. Walcott describes this masculine quest for the utopian island as a "near-delirium" for a Nouvelle Cythère, nesomania for what was always "far and feverish"—a feminized utopia that "dilate(d) on the horizon" (1986, 481). Hundreds of explorers, including James Cook, were sent to the Pacific to obtain this illusory counter-island to the northern hemisphere. Of course, these imagined island topographies were never homogenously defined. Within their own time period they represented a system of ante-islands; heterotopias that were alternately idyllic or inhabited by ruthless cannibals. This is apparent in the colonial polarization of islanders into what Bernard Smith (1985) describes as "hard" and "soft" primitives, and in the naming of the Caribbean as the realm of cannibals, a contrast to a presumably more peaceful "Pacific."¹⁰

Like orientalism, a system of "islandism" was constructed less through contact with others than through the textual exchange between Europeans. This is visible in the ideological construction of anticipated island landfall and the vast array of artistic and literary depictions of island topoi, shipwrecks, and contact with "Indians" that dominated the colonial imagination. Considering the multiple waves of European voyagers, cartographers, botanists, beachcombers, traders, slavers, missionaries, and colonial officials to every single island in the Pacific and Caribbean, and the resulting eradication of many island inhabitants, the perpetuation of this image of island isolation can best be described as a European myth that seeks to erase the colonial intentionality of the past.

The desire for depopulated islands in which European men could refashion themselves helps to explain why, between 1788 and 1910, over 500 desert-island stories were published in England alone (Carpenter 1984, 8) and why *Robinson Crusoe* underwent six reprintings in its first year of publication (1719). The Robinsonades, or island solitude and adventure stories so popular in western Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, may have been inspired by *Robinson Crusoe*, but Defoe's sources indicate that the genre's origins extend across space and time to the east.¹¹ While the desert-island genre did not originate in Europe, it certainly found its most receptive audience there. Widely read in the British colonies, the novel was one of the first secular texts to be translated into Maori (1852). In the Caribbean, *Robinson Crusoe* is described by Walcott as "our first book, our profane Genesis" (1986, 92). In "Crusoe's Journal" he observes, "Posing as naturalists,/drunks, castaways, beachcombers, all of us/yearn for those

fantasies of innocence" (94). But this innocence, Walcott remarks elsewhere, can be likened to the "hallucination of imperial romance," a narrative in which the spaces of the most brutal forms of human subjugation, the slave islands, are labeled in sweet utopian terms, as "Fortunate Isles" and "Sugar Islands." This begs Walcott's question: "When they named these [islands] . . . was it nostalgia or irony?" (306).

Since the colonial expansion of Europe, its literature has increasingly inscribed the island as a reflection of various political, sociological, and colonial practices; in texts from Thomas More's *Utopia* to Shakespeare's *The Tempest*, the island is a material and discursive site for experiments in governance, racial mixing, imprisonment, and enslavement. Broadly speaking, European inscriptions of island topoi have often upheld imperial logic and must be recognized as ideological tools that helped make colonial expansion possible. Diana Loxley has shown that the island-adventure genre was central to the indoctrination of British boys into the emerging ideologies of muscular Christianity, British nationalism, and empire. It is not only that the resources and labor of island spaces were vital to the expansion of Europe and its subsequent industrialization; inscribing these islands as isolated suppressed their relationship to the colonial metropole and minimized knowledge of their contributions to the production of British literature. This is apparent in the incredibly popular narratives of *accidental* arrival to island shores through shipwreck which have a direct—albeit mystifying—relationship to the height of colonial expansion.

The self-made male who accidentally colonizes a desert isle has been a powerful and repeated trope of empire building and of British literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In fact, these Robinsonades have been described as a literary "frenzy" (J. Ballantyne 1994, 267). From these nineteenth-century island-adventure novels—which include Robert Louis Stevenson's *Treasure Island* and R. M. Ballantyne's *The Coral Island*—we might outline the following general patterns or narrative tropes. First, the accidental arrival, via shipwreck, of a Christian, European male (often a boy) to island shores. The island is deserted, constructed as *terra nullius* (empty land), tropical, and extremely fertile. (Indeed, there are few Arctic island-adventure stories.) As Loxley has shown, the island's lack of inhabitants provides a *tabula rasa* for colonialism and the birth of a new social order. Third, the new landscape is submitted to European rule through domestication and cultivation; the protagonist develops new skills as a result. In fact, the island is often represented as a female body; as Loxley remarks, "an unrelenting feature of island discourse is that the adventurer-hero of this free environment should not be constrained by the hegemo-

INTRODUCTION

nising power of the feminine" (1990, 56). The landscape is then subjected to empirical observation and experiment, which leads to rational control of unknown natural forces. Fifth, the protagonist fears the arrival of indigenous islanders whom he assumes are cannibals; in a reversal of power relations, he believes the islanders desire to consume him. Paradoxically, this presumption is not derived from empirical science but learned through the oral traditions of sailors' yarns and travelers' tales, which are invoked for dramatic affect and as a validation of the expanding colonial textuality of island space.

In the sixth step of the successful Robinsonade, the colonist's experience on the island leads to philosophical reflections on biological, religious, social, and/or political origins. These reflections are vital to counter the fear of regression due to the protagonist's lack of European books, a language community, woolen clothing, and Christian social mores. If the protagonist is isolated on the island, his fears are realized through trope number eight: the arrival of a non-European, non-Christian subject. This reverses colonial relations by positioning the islander as intrusive arrivant and the European colonist as the natural inhabitant. By bringing together the work of Mary Louise Pratt (1992) and Greg Dening, we recognize their "contact zone" on the beach, a space of "beginnings and endings . . . the frontiers and boundaries of islands" (1980, 32). Since this is a traveling or "restless native," one of the most feared icons of the colonial archive, this arrival is often associated with violence to the European in the form of kidnapping, infanticide, cannibalism, or murder. This in turn justifies a European moral imperative to respond with technological violence (firearms). After the display of force, trope number ten becomes possible: the assimilation of the islander into European social mores through indoctrination into European language, Christianity, labor, and dress. Through this process "the native" is renamed and becomes the primary source of labor. After a period of the accumulation of wealth and knowledge, the supremacy of European technology is reiterated by the arrival of a large ship, a "floating island" that transports its human and material resources to the metropole. Since the European has conquered his island, he departs to narrate the tale from the northern metropole, usually abandoning his island slaves, servants, mistress, wife, or children. In fact, the pairing of the desert-island-adventure narrative with its first-person inscription from the safety and familiarity of the colonial center is an integral and final trope of the Robinsonade; it assures the reading public of the ability to adapt and even rule in distant overseas territories with the guarantee of return and an uncomplicated assimilation back into the metropole. As Loxley has

demonstrated, the island sanitizes and dehistoricizes the violence of the colonial process, providing “a laboratory for the propagation and nurturing of a perfect masculinity” (1990, 117).

These colonial narratives of island adventure were integral to normalizing the crossing of great expanses of space and in naturalizing the British diaspora to its island colonies. By imagining the ship as a nation and the island as a mere extension of the ship (which was already interpellated as a “floating island”), the migration of voluntary colonists was depicted in attractive terms that emphasized the bounded and controlled nature of island space. The great achievement of these hundreds upon hundreds of Robinsonades is that they also imparted a new spatial logic to the British reading public in which time and space were compressed; the presumed primitivism of the island colony was contrasted to the progressive modernity of the metropole, without recognition of the ways in which the uneven exchange of resources, labor, information, and even the Robinsonades themselves made these temporal and economic divisions possible. Over time, metropolitans came to identify the island as a remote, tropical, and geographical ideal divorced from the industrial temperate north, which of course was created *by* exploitation of the islands of the global south. Robinson Crusoe, we must remember, was a plantation owner on the way to obtain African slaves when his ship wrecked in the Caribbean. The spatial disconnection between a consuming reading public and the island-adventure genre suggests that the timeless and remote island can only signify as such when it is constructed in binary opposition to the history and geography of its continental visitors.

We may very well ask whether the representation of, to draw from one famous American television series, an idyllic “Fantasy Island” is necessarily a cause for alarm. The problem with perpetuating images of island isolation is that they relegate islanders to a remote and primitive past, denying them entrance into the modernity of their colonial “motherlands.” Although these formulaic motifs were vital to the production of two centuries’ worth of Robinsonades, they also appear in the representation of islands by some anthropologists, and they have been used to justify both military and tourist occupation of tropical island spaces. Like the presumably static “native” visited by the traditional anthropologist, islanders are often depicted in western discourse as symbols of the evolutionary past. Scholars have demonstrated that the indigenous association with place (especially in the wake of his/her colonial *displacement*) is often interpreted as natural confinement. According to Arjun Appadurai, this derives from the “quintessentially mobile” white male anthropologist, who visits

INTRODUCTION

indigenous people in their “natural environment” (1996, 39). James Clifford (1988) and Johannes Fabian (1983) have pointed out that Enlightenment ideology and European anthropological praxis often position native peoples in a homogenous, prepositional time antecedent to the western narrative of linear progress. It is in this way that island societies are dehistoricized and represented as an undeveloped and premature moment in the trajectory of biological and cultural evolution.

The ideological apparatus associated with the Robinsonades may also be traced to anthropological uses of the term “culture island,” which signifies “an isolated group or area; especially: *an isolated ethnological group*” (my emphasis). Here *Webster’s Dictionary* highlights an implicit connection between bounded space and culture, a conflation that has been vital to evolutionary anthropological models. As always, the construction of the island as remote is contingent upon the cultural and geographic center that employs it. For example, Patrick Kirch explains that island societies have been “fertile intellectual terrain for anthropology . . . [and] have long provided inspirational material for the advance of anthropological method and theory” (1986, 1). Historian Oskar Spate referred to the “insular” Pacific Islands as “so splendidly splittable into Ph.D. topics” (quoted in Kirch 1986, 2). Kirch cites a number of important anthropological theories that derived from island topography, including structuralism and functionalism. As in other discursive fields, island boundedness is confused with closure to uphold the myth of the hermetically sealed laboratory. Significantly, Kirch points out that anthropologists were so entrenched in island boundedness, isolation, and atemporality (“shallow time depth”) that archeological inquiries were hardly made until recently; interpretations of heavily scrutinized islands such as Tikopia were so focused on “internal processes of change” that “regional [transoceanic] exchange networks” were overlooked (1986, 4). The refusal to recognize the maritime technologies of non-European peoples has prevented the larger scientific community from recognizing the intentional settlement of the Americas by sea rather than by the Bering Strait thesis, which posits herds of animals as the real agents of migration and therefore history.

In fact, the cartographic and ethnic partition of the Pacific into Melanesia, Polynesia, and Micronesia highlights the ways in which ocean voyaging and exchange between the islands were threatening to the continental arrivants. Likewise, spurious cultural divisions were also made between the “peaceful Arawaks” of the Caribbean and the supposedly anthropophagous Caribs.¹² Recent scholarship demonstrates that, like Oceania, the region had been interconnected by maritime trade routes for centuries before

European arrival. This reminds us that most areas interpellated as remote and isolated isles are in fact *archipelagoes* with long maritime histories of interconnection. This ideological division of archipelagoes into isolated islands traveled westward with the colonists, rerouting their classical Mediterranean roots in the Caribbean and the Pacific.

Geologist Patrick Nunn, remarking on the “the continuation of the islands under the sea,” explains that most islands “are no more than the tips . . . of huge ocean-floor volcanoes: to pretend that their formation can be diagnosed solely from looking at those parts above sea level is ludicrous” (1994, 112). In a similar vein, Robert Sullivan’s poem “Ocean Birth” inscribes the emergence of the islands from the sea and imagines their human residents on “the skin of the ocean” (2005, 37). Geologically and symbolically speaking, the earth’s surface cannot represent its deep history; the island poet must plumb the subterranean and the subaquatic layers of human and planetary change. These depths reflect shared experience across time and space in Kamau Brathwaite’s assertion that “the unity is submarine” (1974, 64), positioning the islands as autonomous and geologically, historically, and culturally connected to their neighbors. Glissant builds upon Brathwaite’s vision when he adopts “submarine roots” as a model of regional history. He writes, “[s]ubmarine roots: that is floating free, not fixed in one position in some primordial spot, but extending in all directions in our world through its networks and branches” (1989, 67). It is this fundamental connection between geography and history that allows Glissant to draw insightful parallels between French neocolonialism in Martinique and Micronesia. He upholds “the reality of archipelagoes in the Caribbean or the Pacific provides a natural illustration of the thought of Relation,” a model for a tidal dialectic that engages multiple temporalities, complex and dynamic space, multilingualism, and orally transmitted knowledges (1997, 34–35).

We must question the perpetuation of the isolated isle because it depopulates the islands of those who contributed significantly to the world’s financial, scientific, and ideological development. C. L. R. James and Sidney Mintz have pointed out the error in relegating the Caribbean to an archaic periphery when in fact the earliest machines of industrial slavery were created in their sugar plantations.¹³ This is not merely an issue of erasing the past because it can be traced to current imperial expansion. For instance, the U.S. military was able to carry on its 1946 nuclear testing in Bikini (Micronesia) based on the island’s supposed remoteness and insignificant population. Yet Micronesia’s remoteness did not deter President Harry Truman from deciding to create a strategic trust territory that same year in

INTRODUCTION

order to militarize the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana islands and place them under the governorship of the U.S. Navy. Years later, when Micronesians lobbied for demilitarization and self-governance, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger retorted: “There are only 90,000 people out there. Who gives a damn?”¹⁴ Yet under the People’s Revolutionary Government, Grenada’s population was similar in size and ideals of sovereignty, and the United States certainly did “give a damn.”

In fact, the Bikini Atoll was not *remote enough* to prevent the neighboring Rongelap Islanders from suffering the deadly effects of nuclear fallout carried by the wind. It was not remote enough to prevent nuclear contamination of the Pacific and its spread to Africa, Antarctica, and Europe. It was not remote enough to prevent its detailed photographic documentation by the U.S. military to ensure that tens of thousands of nuclear test images were distributed worldwide as a testament to their apocalyptic power in the Cold War. This troubling legacy of U.S. imperialism is not only unknown by most Americans, it has been shown by Teresia Teaiwa (2000) to have been eroticized by the two-piece bathing suit that was named after these devastating experiments. In a disturbing full circle from colonial to tourist occupation and consumption, Bikini Atoll has been designated one of the best tourist spots for scuba diving in the military wreckage. One company calls the Bikini trip an “island adventure” and, while admitting the region’s extensive militarization, entices tourists to visit to “get a real sense as to how Robinson Crusoe must have felt.”¹⁵

Island colonization, land alienation, and indigenous displacement are connected to contemporary tourism in Donald Kalpokas’s 1974 poem, “Who am I?” Writing as a student in Fiji about his home in the dually colonized New Hebrides, Kalpokas was a vital part of the independence movement and ultimately became Vanuatu’s prime minister. His polemic poem explains how his land “was alienated through fraud” and the “Protocols of 1914,” which divided his home between England and France.

I travel abroad with my identity card
 For I am stateless and have no right. . . .
 Who am I, lost in this ocean of confusion?
 . . . I am that third citizen of my country,
 The only condominium in the world. (quoted in Subramani 1992, 50)

Kalpokas’s poem raises compelling questions about the connections between colonial and tourist models of the repeating island and how they restructure landscape to mimic other island colonies. Although Pacific voyagers

settled Vanuatu over four thousand years ago, the Portuguese explorer Pedro Fernández de Quirós assumed he had discovered Antillia, the great southern ante-island, so he named the largest island of the group Australia del Espíritu Santo. A century later, the French explorer Antoine de Bougainville interpellated the same islands as Les Grandes Cyclades, naming them after the Greek isles in the Aegean Sea. Less than a decade later, they were renamed the New Hebrides after Scottish islands by James Cook. Although there were important historical differences between colonial powers, this repeating-island story is striking because it highlights an ideological *contraction* of island space and time between the Atlantic and Pacific as a product of European *expansion*. Moreover, the British and French used their Caribbean Island colonies as models for the remapping and restructuring of Vanuatu. As such, this became an all-too-familiar colonial island story about plantation monoculture, illegal recruitment and kidnapping of island labor (blackbirding), and native alienation from land, culture, and resources.¹⁶

The 1914 protocols that open the first lines of Kalpokas's poem reflect the dual system of Anglo-French governance called "the condominium," a historical contract that alienated the region's indigenous occupants and a reference to the new architectures of tourism, which also relegates ni-Vanuatu to "third citizenship." His poem demonstrates that native land alienation has been exacerbated by tourism and U.S. militarization, reflecting multiple colonial demands upon the economy and resources. The speaker has no sovereign ship of state in this "ocean of confusion." He concedes that "at least" he "is still able to swim," but parodies the Robinsonade in his fear that he may be "washed ashore/On the desert of a French Pacific Republic." Given the long and complex history of Pacific Island voyaging, Kalpokas's depiction of an indigenous speaker as flotsam at sea, without a vessel of sovereignty or directionality in navigating a course towards land-fall suggests a troubling tidalectic between transoceanic migration and a loss of sovereignty. Moreover, the speaker's displacement from the land renders him a castaway in his own ancestral ocean. It also makes him a captive of the Robinsonade narrative, in which he fears the depopulation of his own island home, a "desert" space, unoccupied and devoid of sustaining water. Ironically, his island is not represented through indigenous topography but rather is mapped by the dry colonial name, "French Pacific Republic." Given the metaphorical relationship between the ship and the state, we can interpret Kalpokas's speaker as deprived of his own vessel of sovereignty due to the dual appropriation of a "French Pacific" Ocean and a Platonic ship of the "Republic."

INTRODUCTION

Writing in Fiji about the decolonization process at home, Kalpokas's poem gives us an opportunity to think through the ways in which island literature has been deeply informed by the transoceanic imaginary. Reflecting back to the Eric Roach poem that opened this chapter, we can see that Kalpokas is similarly concerned with the worldliness of island geography and history, and inscribes a tidalectic imagination in which the loss of land is interpreted from the perspective of the sea. His depiction of an "ocean of confusion," in which rights and citizenship are in flux for the island subject, reflects a maritime imagery of globalization, a grammar of fluidity and flow that is directly connected to the territorial scramble for the seas.

The Transoceanic Imaginary

You want to hear my history? Ask the sea.
—Derek Walcott, "The Sea is History"

I have emphasized the close relationship between British maritime expansion and the discursive construction of tropical island space to provide a new model for understanding anglophone literary genealogies. A tidalectic engagement with the formulation of British literature demonstrates the ways in which the chronotope (time-space) of the island—from *The Tempest* to *Robinson Crusoe*—is as vital to this literary canon as the sea. While postcolonial studies has revealed the ways in which empire-building was a constitutive element of British literature, we are only just beginning to understand that it was the desert-island *and* nautical-adventure genres that were vital to imagining this transoceanic empire. Where the desert-isle genre emphasizes the boundedness of islands, tidalectics engage with their watery surroundings, foregrounding the routes of the oceanic imaginary. In fact, writers of the Pacific and Caribbean have turned to narratives of transoceanic migration to undermine the myth of the confined islander, an ontological contrast to the mobile European male who produces world history by traversing space. Turning to the sea, we destabilize the myth of island isolation and open up new possibilities for engaging a dynamic history of time-space.

Half of the world's population lives within a few miles of the sea, and when we include its staggering depths, 95 percent of the earth's biosphere is ocean. The sea is often described in cosmologies as the space of human origins, a narrative upheld by the biological sciences. Marine biologist Sylvia Earle explains that "our origins are there, reflected in the briny solution

coursing through our veins and in the underlying chemistry that links us to all other life" (1995, 15). The ocean supports our lives on this planet through its hydrologic cycles and is often described as the earth's lungs, responsible for the "planetary respiratory rhythm"; Earle asserts that "every breath we take is linked to the sea" (1995, xiv). Despite our complete dependence on this dynamic originary space, it remains one of radical alterity. The sea, to Roland Barthes, is a "non-signifying field." He exclaims: "Here I am, before the sea; it is true that it bears no message. But on the beach, what material for semiology!" (1972, 112). Barthes's terrestrial bias may be questioned when we consider how the subject *internalizes* this alterity by rendering the sea in the blood. For example, Jacques Cousteau observes that "our flesh is composed of myriads of cells, each one of which contains a miniature ocean . . . comprising all the salts of the sea, probably the built-in heritage of our distant ancestry, when some mutating fish turned into reptiles" (1976, 13). According to Elisabeth Mann Borgese, humans may have swum before they walked. Just as the vastness of the sea challenges our limited concepts of space, so the ocean is at once our origin and "our liquid future" (1975, 17), destabilizing our notions of linear human time. Borgese explains, "Every drop of water that existed on the earth or around it billions of years ago is still there, whether in solid form or liquid or gaseous . . . every drop is still there" (18).

The sea is conceptually linked to human origins and exploring these fluid histories offers an alternative to the rigid ethnic genealogies of colonialism and nationalism. In other words, the ocean's perpetual movement is radically decentering; it resists attempts to fix a locus of history. Focusing on seascape rather than landscape as the fluid space of historical production allows us to complicate the nation-state, which encodes a rigid hierarchy of race, class, gender, religion, and ethnicity for its representative subjects. Because the surface of the ocean is unmarked by its human history and thus cannot be monumentalized in the tradition of colonial landscapes, a turn to the seas as history can produce an equalizing effect, allowing us to recognize the long maritime histories of island peoples prior to the arrival of Europeans. In fact, Caribbean and Pacific Islanders were noted for their massive voyaging canoes, and their ability to navigate thousands of maritime miles during an era when Europeans had not determined longitude and were consistently wrecking their ships. As a chronotope of the moving island and a unifying symbol of routes and roots, I foreground the trace of the word "canoe," a term introduced to the English language as a transliteration of the Taíno (Arawak) term "canoas." The Pacific Islands have a

INTRODUCTION

significant parallel in the term “vaka.” As *vessels of history*, canoes and vaka are vital to the historical genealogy of both regions, a point explored in the first section of this book.

The Pacific and Caribbean islands were first settled about 4,000 BCE by multiple seafaring arrivals from the continental lands to their respective west. Both areas were marked by complex processes of interculturation, trade, and migration, which challenge attempts to determine an originary home for the early island migrants. The process of arrival and adaptation highlights the ways in which land and sea are territorialized by migrant populations, and offers a complex alter/native historiography to European colonial models of the past. This tidalectic approach marks a significant break from colonial maps that depict land and sea as unmarked, atemporal, and feminized voids, *terra nullius* and *aqua nullius*, unless traversed and/or occupied by (male) European agents of history.

Placing these island regions in a dialogue with each other allows us to see the complex historical relationships to the waters that surround them. Like the island, the ocean has functioned as a space of human origins; thus the sea and voyaging motifs are prevalent in cosmogenesis narratives of each region. For example, Walcott’s meditation on “Origins” positions his human speaker as “foetus of plankton” (1986, 11).¹⁷ The sea is history in Walcott’s poem “Names,” which begins: “My race began as the sea began/ with no nouns, and with no horizon . . . with a different fix on the stars” (305). Drawing attention to how the production of space also produces race—and its naming and therefore its conceptual confinement—Walcott’s poem highlights the aporia between language and its object, mapping and space. The ocean’s incomprehensibility is mirrored cosmologically in deep space (the stars), producing a metaphor of origins that also undermines the structures of language used to represent it. The human employment of language and maps is precisely how, Walcott explains, “the mind was halved by a horizon” (305). In this poem, dedicated to Kamau Brathwaite, “the stick to trace our names on the sand” is merely provisional. Ultimately our creator, the sea, will “erase” all human inscriptions such as language and cartography (306).

Inscribing the sea as origin, while a provisional human effort at historiography, is also an enduring characteristic of island literature. Walcott’s speaker becomes a namable subject only after sharing island space with other artisan-migrants such as a “goldsmith from Benares,” a “stonecutter from Canton,” and a “bronzesmith from Benin” (306). The poem questions how to refashion Old World art forms for newly creolized societies after the dehumanizing wake of slavery and indenture. Ultimately, the

shared history of transoceanic migration to the islands provides an inexhaustible spatial imaginary for reflections on origins. Caribbean writers have inscribed the Atlantic as an originary space for the peoples of the African diaspora, in a tidalectic engagement between continents. To Walcott's characters in *Omeros*, "Mer was both mother and sea" (1990, 231) while in Grace Nichols's poetry, the structures of time-space collapse in the traumatic birth through the "middle passage womb" (1983, 5). By tracing a connection to the past through ancestry and genealogy, a characteristic trope of postcolonial writing in that it destabilizes the universalizing (and dehumanizing) narrative of colonial history, these writers make a familial claim to space that naturalizes the process of diaspora.

Since all arrivants to islands before the twentieth century came by water, the sea is often positioned as an origin for the diverse peoples of the Caribbean and the Pacific. Writing from Fiji, Pacific theorist Epeli Hau'ofa has explained, "all of us in Oceania today, whether indigenous or otherwise, can truly assert that the sea is our common heritage" (1997, 142). Jamaican novelist Patricia Powell (1998) has inscribed the nineteenth-century voyages from China to the Caribbean in ways that situate the sea as origin and liken the experience of indenture ships to the brutalities of the middle passage. Trinidadian writer Ramabai Espinet inscribes crossing kala pani or the dark waters between India and the Caribbean in similarly traumatic terms, as "a passage into death and sickness and unending labour, and into a light that was the present" (2003, 284). Fijian writer Subramani opens his novella "Gone Bush" with the words: "In the beginning was the sea . . . everything came out of the sea . . . from it came the goddess of life" (1988, 77). Although the Indian protagonist "seemed . . . [like] someone from a landlocked culture whose people were riders of horses" (77), like Walcott's narrator, the process of migration to the islands has realigned this character's relationship towards the sea.¹⁸

By employing a tidalectic framework, we can highlight the transoceanic trajectories of diaspora to the Caribbean and Pacific islands, underlining their shared similarities in geo-pelagic relation rather than the limiting model of national frameworks. As long as it does not bracket off the referents of history, as Joan Dayan (1996) aptly warns of some theories of the black Atlantic, the transoceanic imaginary can be a powerful metaphor to signal the cultural transition to new island landscapes, complicating the notion of static roots and offering a fluid paradigm of migratory routes.¹⁹ As a constitutive element of tidalectics, the transoceanic imaginary foregrounds the fluid connection between the Pacific and Caribbean islands and the role of geography—and oceanography—in shaping cultural pro-

INTRODUCTION

duction. The focus on island migration as a vital narrative trope of these regions is helpful because it can accommodate any number of arrivals and highlights the process of human sedimentation. Importantly, migration is not valorized as a facile metaphor for masculine agency in history. The cultural and historical production of those who cannot and do not travel, particularly women, must be considered as a constitutive element in the framework of the routing of diaspora. Moreover, a focus on the production of local roots needs to problematize the gendered conflation of women with land and, by extension, the land with national belonging. Engaging a tidalectic model of routes and roots as a comparative frame to connect two different island regions foregrounds the conceptual similarities of geography and history, such as the association of women with space and men with time. This comparative tidalectic also allows for the emergence of historical and social contrast, such as the tension between diaspora and indigeneity, which highlights the distinctiveness between and within the regions' literary production. This book seeks to highlight the ways in which the process of migration and settlement produces diasporic and indigenous subjects in an active relationship with the land and sea.

The transoceanic imagination, produced by "peoples of the sea," is vital to postcolonial writing of the past two decades and is particularly visible in Pacific and (black) Atlantic studies. Building upon the work of James Clifford (1988 and 1992) and Marcus Rediker (1987), Paul Gilroy has famously rendered the "shape of the Atlantic as a system of cultural exchanges" where "the movements of black people—not only as commodities but engaged in various struggles towards emancipation, autonomy, and citizenship—provides a means to reexamine the problems of nationality, location, identity and historical memory" (1993, 16). Although the ocean is a primary space to imagine the histories of diaspora, it is also a vital space for the production of the indigenous Pacific. This is particularly evident in the work of Hau'ofa, a Pacific anthropologist and director of the Oceania Centre for Arts and Culture, who provides an essential theoretical framework to destabilize the myth of island isolation. He asserts, "There is a gulf between viewing the Pacific as 'islands in a far sea' and as 'a sea of islands.' The first emphasizes dry surfaces in a vast ocean far from the centers of power, exaggerating their smallness and remoteness, whereas the latter places islands "in the totality of their relationships" (1993b, 7). He explains:

The idea that (Oceania) is too small, too poor and too isolated . . . overlooks culture history, and the contemporary process of what

might be called “world enlargement” carried out by tens of thousands of ordinary Pacific Islanders . . . making nonsense of all national and economic boundaries, borders that have been defined only recently, criss-crossing an ocean that had been boundless for ages before Captain Cook’s apotheosis. (6)

Drawing from the western conceit that masculine movement across space produces history, Hau’ofa destabilizes the conflation of the indigenous islander with static land by drawing upon the transoceanic imagination. His theory of a “sea of islands” reorients land and territory-based analysis towards the complex processes of interculturation generated by ancient and contemporary transoceanic movement. Inspired by the dynamic expansion of the volcanic island of Hawai’i, and quoting Walcott’s aphorism that “the sea is history,” Hau’ofa determines that “our roots, our origins are embedded in the sea,” which is “our pathway to each other” (1997, 147, 148). Hau’ofa’s early anthropological work was conducted in Trinidad and he has maintained an important conceptual connection between both island regions. His theory of island history is remarkably like Glissant’s model of “submarine roots” (1989, 67) and Brathwaite’s postulation that island “unity is submarine” (1974, 64).²⁰ A view of the archipelagoes as a submarine rhizome is shared by these theorists whose works permeate various linguistic, cultural, and geographic borders.

The transoceanic imagination is a hallmark of island theorists and diaspora discourse. Like Hau’ofa and Glissant, Benítez-Rojo’s work on the repeating island employs aquatic metaphors to focus on the waters of the Caribbean, asserting that the region is a “meta-archipelago” with “neither a boundary nor a centre” (1992, 4). He highlights the diaspora of Caribbean peoples in an effort to destabilize ethnic essentialism and configures the region as being as much in flux as the waters that surround it. By visualizing the archipelago as an island that repeats itself into varying fractal spaces, Benítez-Rojo concludes: “the culture of the Caribbean . . . is not terrestrial but aquatic . . . [it] is the natural and indispensable realm of marine currents, of waves, of folds and double folds, of fluidity and sinuosity” (11). Water appeals because of its lack of fixity and rootedness; as Gaston Bachelard explains, it is a “transitory element. It is the essential ontological metamorphosis between heaven and earth. A being dedicated to water is a being in flux” (1983, 6). Since migration and creolization are so characteristic of island cultural formations, watery trajectories provide an apt metaphor for ethnicities “in flux.” To foreground transoceanic migrations that brought African, Asian, European, and indigenous settlers to

INTRODUCTION

the islands destabilizes rigid genealogical roots and offers a fluid metaphor for dynamic routes. For example, Samoan writer Albert Wendt refers to himself as “a pelagic fish on permanent migration” (1995b, 13). Walcott refers to the Caribbean as “the liquid Antilles” (1986, 44) and charts an “iconography of the sea” (240). This provides an aquatic space that is materially unmarked by European monuments and an alter/native imaginary for postcolonial island history. These “webbed networks” (Gilroy 1993, 29) suggest that bodies of water unite black Atlantic, Caribbean, and Pacific peoples and have the potential to dissolve the artificial boundaries of nation-states.

As helpful as these models are for rethinking the ethnic origins and boundaries of the nation, the recent tendency to configure the sea as a space beyond territorialism can exaggerate the agency of migrants and minimize their experiences of border policing. In other words, these maritime theories often valorize transoceanic diaspora without adequately questioning the historical and economic *roots* for migrant *routes*. For example, Benítez-Rojo’s *The Repeating Island* uses marine currents as its trope for superseding social and political hegemonies where the “peoples of the sea” travel across the globe, and “certain dynamics of their culture also repeat and sail through the seas of time” (1992, 16), seemingly without linguistic or national boundaries. Remarkably, these theorists turn to the borderlessness of the ocean only to imagine a body of migrants who are bounded by the limits of race and gender. This formulation of transoceanic male agents of history has ample historical precedence in British imperialism. Thus while we embrace these new formulations of fluid transoceanic movement, we must be cautious about the ways in which they recirculate discarded paradigms of nationalism and regionalism. Secondly, we must also pay close attention to the ways in which the conceptual move to claim ocean space may derive from neocolonial expansion and a radical new territorialism of the seas. Pinpointing its mechanism is particularly difficult when theorizing the ocean as a space of history. The ocean, as Glissant reminds us of the Caribbean Sea, tends to deflect and refract meaning. As Christopher Connery has demonstrated, the ocean has “long functioned as capital’s myth element” (1996, 289), creating a lacuna precisely where we should be able to trace the expansion of both capital and empire.

Diaspora studies privilege space, so I would like to shift from these spatial theories of transoceanic migration to examine how they have travelled across time. For it is by historicizing these “peoples of the sea” that one finds a surprising—and disturbing—congruence. In the nineteenth century, English travel historian James Anthony Froude had written exten-

sively of whom he had called the “children of the sea,” but he was referring to British settlers and their fleets in his travel narrative *Oceana, or, England and Her Colonies* (1886). In fact, this valorization of transoceanic migration was a crucial component of British empire building. Froude exclaims that “the sea is the natural home of Englishmen; the Norse blood is in us, and we rove over the waters, for business or pleasure, as eagerly as our ancestors” (1886, 18). In his later and more infamous work, *The English in the West Indies* (1888), Froude proudly recites the maritime destiny that allowed the English to claim the Caribbean Sea from the Spanish and French. Although Froude is considered an anathema to Caribbean scholars, his words are clearly reminiscent of Benítez-Rojo when the latter explains, “The Antilleans’ insularity does not impel them toward isolation, but on the contrary toward travel, toward exploration, toward the search for fluvial and marine routes” (1992, 25). Froude’s sense that “the sea is the easiest of highways” (1886, 11–12) is echoed in Hau’ofa’s assertion that “the sea is our pathway to each other, and to everyone else” (1997, 148). Once the British girded the globe with submarine telegraph cables and standardized sea travel with steam ships in the late nineteenth century, the ocean became an increasingly accessible conduit for imperial technology and travel. Thus Froude’s interpellation of the ocean was merely attempting to *naturalize* the ways in which British maritime imperialism had achieved their network of submarine cables, shipping lines, and fleets to rule the waves. Froude’s American contemporary, Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan, in *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* (1894), had argued that “the sea presents itself . . . [as] a great highway; or better, perhaps, of a wide common, [marked by] lines of travel called trade routes [that] reflect the history of the world” (1957, 25). In making what became an influential argument for the rise of the U.S. maritime empire, Mahan invoked those English ancestors of the Americans to argue that “an inborn love of the sea, the pulse of that English blood which still beat[s] in their veins, keep[s] alive all those tendencies and pursuits upon which a healthy sea power depends” (1957, 38–39). Like Froude, Mahan merges the fluidity of the sea with the racialized blood of Anglo-Saxon diaspora to naturalize colonial and military expansion.

In these particular cases, the transoceanic imaginary entails a valorization of international travel, an unmarked male and elite class, and a suppression of the experiences of women, indentured laborers, slaves, refugees, and many other *forced* migrations that represent the majority of nineteenth-century and contemporary diasporas. By naturalizing the “peoples of the sea,” these theories depoliticize and dehistoricize trajectories of migration. Claiming marine travel as cultural or genealogical essence or, in Gilroy’s

INTRODUCTION

terms, “cross-cultural fluidity,” these writers may overlook colonial and neocolonial motives for transnational migrancy. It certainly cannot be a coincidence that theories valorizing transnational migrants emerge during the highest peaks of migration in the nineteenth century and in our contemporary globalized moment. As poetic as it may seem, most migrants do not choose to permanently leave their homes because their saline blood flows like the oceans or because they inherited a maritime sensibility through their ancestors. In fact, while this may be an era of the greatest movements of people in global history, it seems that the only migrants who relocate by sea are the elite on luxury vessels, whose wealth exceeds the constraints of the nation, or the ultradispossessed on makeshift watercraft, whose poverty prevents their navigation of a vehicle of national sovereignty. While clearly my work is aligned with diaspora theory to foreground migrant agency, I suggest that it is problematic to claim “fluvial and marine routes” for peoples that do not have the backing of a military fleet and the type of imperial power that undergirds Froude’s celebration of the late nineteenth-century “Caucasian tsunami” (Crosby 1986, 300).

I want to emphasize what is generally invisible to diaspora studies and racialize the dominant discourse of the “Caucasian tsunami” in order to interrogate its imperial metaphors of migration and regionalism. My invocations of Froude’s geographic imagination are intended to historicize transatlantic discourse and to highlight how the process of migration is integral to regionalist metaphors. In fact, one cannot envision a united region like the Caribbean or Pacific if there are no migrants linking the islands together. Hau’ofa’s (1993b) vision of Oceania, for instance, was facilitated by his travel to Hawai‘i, just as George Lamming’s (1984) primary identification of the Caribbean as a region occurred on a transatlantic voyage with other West Indians. Yet regional and diasporic paradigms, while they may seem to exceed the limitations of the nation, often reflect their imperial roots and routes. If I may extend this analysis further back into the history of British imperialism, we see that Froude had a political precursor in this quest to unify diverse islands into a federated archipelago. James Harrington’s *The Commonwealth of Oceana* (1656) is Froude’s primary inspiration. Harrington has the following to say about the recently consolidated (read: colonized) British archipelago: “The situation of these countries, being islands . . . seems to have been designed by God for a commonwealth . . . The sea gives the law to the growth of Venice, but the growth of Oceana gives the law to the sea” (Harrington quoted in Froude 1886, 2–3). Interestingly, Harrington evokes Pliny the Elder’s model of imperial space which positions Rome at the center of the Mediterranean

Sea, a space “chosen by... providence... to unite scattered empires, to make manners gentle, to draw together... the uncouth tongues of so many nations” (Pliny quoted in Leed 1991, 136). Likewise, Harrington’s divine commonwealth attempted to homogenize the unequal political and social relations between Ireland, Scotland, England, and Wales. His theory of a divinely designed archipelago was then appropriated by Froude, who applied this to the islands of the Pacific and then later to the British colonies of the Caribbean. Like current diaspora theories that focus on transoceanic migration, Froude argued that the British empire was primarily connected through maritime routes. “Oceana” he surmised, “would be a single commonwealth embraced in the arms of Neptune” (1886, 2). Froude remarks that Harrington would be “incredulous” to know that two centuries after his treatise

More than fifty-million Anglo-Saxons would be spread over the vast continent of North America, carrying with them their religion, their laws, their language, and their manners; that the globe would be circled with their fleets; that in the Southern Hemisphere they would be in possession of territories larger than Europe, and more fertile than the richest parts of it; that wherever they went they would carry with them the genius of English freedom. (1886, 2)

Although all of these theories celebrate migrancy, Froude clearly draws upon the rhetoric of divine destiny, where the Anglo-Saxons are positioned, not in the centralizing metaphors of Pliny’s Roman empire, but as diasporic Israelites, who “settled” and “multiplied” (1886, 2). Their “portmanteau biota,” as Crosby would have it, is ignored in Froude’s emphasis on culture rather than pathogens, democracy rather than enslavement and dispossession. Froude’s vision of white diaspora excludes the material circumstances of British and Asian indentured laborers, African slaves, and the peoples who occupied these lands before the “genius of English freedom” was forced upon them.²¹ This freedom, of course, was constituted by these experiments in enslavement and colonial rule.

Juxtaposing these imperial narratives of Anglo-Saxon diaspora alongside contemporary formulations of maritime migration in the black Atlantic and Pacific does not mean that they are equivalent.²² But their similar imaginaries suggest that we as scholars need to be attentive to the ways in which metaphors of spatial mobility, or routes, are adapted over time and may have colonial roots. Of course, my position as an American, residing in the belly of the beast, so to speak, means that this book is implicated in

INTRODUCTION

its own critique. As we know from Edward Said (1983) and James Clifford (1992), theories travel and change across space and time; the naturalizing discourse of territorial belonging evidenced in diaspora theory demonstrates its effectiveness for diverse populations of different historical eras. The use of aquatic metaphors, a maritime grammar of the “peoples of the sea,” helps us to recognize the importance of the ocean in the transnational imaginary and in diaspora theory in general. Moreover, historicizing the grammar of diaspora demonstrates how the sea is historically and imaginatively territorialized and cannot function as a facile *aqua nullius* or a blank template for transoceanic migration.

Our Common Heritage: The Blue Revolution

Why has there been such recent growth in the field of transoceanic diaspora studies, in viewing social, historical, and political relationships in terms of Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Ocean studies? Why, when our relationship to the ocean is more estranged and distant than in any other period of human history, are academics suddenly concerned with the history of the sea? To give this an ecological frame, we might say that this heightened interest in the sea derives from our participation in its environmental pollution, similar to the ways in which colonists of the past deforested islands and then mystified this through romanticized ecology and conservation discourse. As Carolyn Merchant (1983) has shown, colonial powers fetishize what they have effectively destroyed. In juxtaposing oceanic discourse at the end of the nineteenth century with its contemporary counterparts, I also want to suggest that the rise in naturalized images of transoceanic diaspora derives from increased maritime territorialism. The modern tendency to incorporate and internalize fluid transnational spaces (as the sea in the blood) may suggest less about an attempt to transcend the boundaries of the ethnic nation-state than the desire to imaginatively integrate the nation’s new maritime territory. Tracing the link between literature and empire, we see that this has historical precedence. For example, scholars have demonstrated that the rise of British maritime imperialism in the eighteenth century was reflected and sustained by its nautical literature. The United States, which wrested maritime dominance from the British in the nineteenth century, also naturalized its expanding naval fleets through the maritime novel. I suggest that just as these literary texts reflected military expansion into the seas, our current efforts to rethink the sea as history arise from a new era of global ocean governance and militarization. This is visible in Hau’ofa’s seminal theory of a sea of islands, where the language

that he employs to articulate “our common inheritance” (1997, 124), is derived from an unprecedented remapping of global sovereignty and common space: the 1982 U. N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). While postcolonial studies has been concerned with mapping and territorialism, the field has not been attentive to the radical shifts in governance of 71 percent of the world’s surface. Atlas, we might remember, was a god of the sea, linking the cartographic production of space with human understandings of the ocean. As I explain in the first chapter, the imperial measurement or rule of the ocean produced latitude and longitude and our modern understanding of universal time. By extension, the process of mapping the Atlantic with the passages of slave ships was crucial to rendering global Euclidean space and to our apprehensions of modernity.

To contextualize the significance of the U. N. Convention on the Law of the Sea we have to place it in the broader historical frame of European expansion and the rise of maritime empires. The first voyage of Columbus resulted in the Treaty of Tordesillas (1493–1494), which halved the world between the Spanish and Portuguese Christian empires by placing a vertical border through the Atlantic Ocean. This act catalyzed European debates about ocean space as property in which Renaissance writers such as Hugo Grotius reinvigorated ancient Roman laws about the nature of *mare clausum* and *mare liberum* (closed and open seas) as they were being redrawn in the Dutch East India territories (Anand 1993). With the rise of the colonial powers, a doctrine of “freedom of the seas” prevailed, defined and controlled by naval military forces. By World War II, ocean space was being rapidly armed, claimed, and mapped by the major maritime empires. The Pacific Ocean was particularly susceptible to American allegations that threats to their national security justified the appropriation of the seas for defense and the testing of missiles and nuclear weapons (Anand 1993, 75–77). By 1945, the first year of the Cold War, President Truman violated the freedom of the seas doctrine with his proclamation that the fisheries and maritime mineral resources contiguous to the U.S. coasts were national territory, greatly extending the littoral (coastal) state to 200 miles out to sea. Two years later Truman violated international law by annexing Micronesia, a “sea of islands” as large as the north Atlantic Ocean, an acquisition that more than doubled U.S. territory. When we factor in the 3.9 billion acres of submarine land and resources, 1.7 times the size of onshore territory, Truman actually *tripled* the size of the United States (National Academy of Sciences 1989, 1). Truman’s proclamation had grown out of wartime oceanographic technologies that had revealed tremendous oil and manganese reserves on the ocean floor, subsoil, and

INTRODUCTION

beds; combined with the postwar interest in establishing submarine atomic weapons and the disposal of nuclear waste, the proclamation catalyzed a new territorialism of the oceans, an international struggle over ocean sovereignty that is ongoing today. In fact, at no other time in history are so many transnational oil companies prospecting and drilling for petroleum and hydrocarbons on the seabed floors.

UNCLOS was created by these contestations over ocean governance, and its charter was forged out of complex relations between the emergent postcolonial states and the dominant western powers. Because the number of sovereign territories doubled after World War II, developing states that had comparatively little in the way of economic leverage were able to gain a new majority lobbying power in the United Nations (Anand 1993, 79). The first U. N. Conference on the Law of the Sea was held in 1958; by the late 1960s, a vital “Third World coalition” became very active, revealing a “surprising cohesion” in terms of lobbying for material access to ocean resources that were dominated by the major maritime powers (Seyom Brown et al. 1977, 25–27). In 1967, Malta Representative Arvid Pardo made a historic address to the U. N. General Assembly. Using his position as a representative from a recently postcolonial island, he called for a resolution that would configure the ocean and its resources as the common heritage of mankind, shared equally among all nations—landlocked and coastal, industrialized and postcolonial. Likening the military scramble for the oceans to the carving up of Africa, Pardo called to replace the freedom of the seas doctrine with one of common heritage, based on the premise of peaceful purpose (Pardo 1975, ii). Pointing out the great economic inequities in the former colonies of Europe, the 1982 Convention legalized a provision that the General Assembly had recognized in 1967: the realm of the “high seas” was the “common heritage” of all nations, and revenue generated from seabed mining, exploration, and fishing must be evenly distributed across the globe, with particular recognition of the needs of the poorer nations (Anand 1993, 82; Allott 1993, 65–66). Because it ratified the interconnectedness of ecosystems and peoples, the 1982 Convention was heralded as the “first comprehensive, binding, enforceable, international environmental law,” which, by establishing the notion of a common heritage, planted “the seed of a new economic order, of a new economic philosophy, and of a new relationship among people and between people and nature” (Borgese 1993, 33).

Importantly for the island writers I have mentioned, the Convention also sanctioned the concept of archipelagic waters, crucial to island nations in that it invested them with greater jurisdiction to protect and manage

seaborne traffic, fish harvesting, and pollution (Van Dyke 1993a, 13). This was a literal and cartographic remapping of presumably isolated isles into a “sea of islands.” The most powerful resistance to the treaty came from the United States, which accused the 1982 Convention of “communism” because it demarcates deep ocean space as a global commons, transforming *mare clausum* into *mare nostrum*. As Borgese points out, these allegations elide the point that the 1982 Convention refuses any territorialization of deep ocean space and thus circumvents future monopolies on maritime resources (1998, 59). Therefore *mare nostrum*, “our sea,” represents a trans-national agreement of mutual participation, conservation, and obligation (Allott 1993, 59). In many ways, the 1982 Convention legitimated indigenous philosophemes of environmental guardianship, particularly those drawn from the Pacific Islands (see Moana Jackson 1993a, 1993b).

It is difficult to image the extent to which the entire globe was remapped because of the ocean’s alterity to continental humans and because the land bias of metropolitan centers often considers deep ocean space to be out of sight and out of mind. Yet in this radical territorial shift, the most important remapping of the globe in recent history, the 1982 Convention expanded the sovereignty of coastal nations to 12 nautical miles, their contiguous zones to 24 nautical miles, and established an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles. All in all, this translates to roughly 38 million square nautical miles of newly territorialized ocean space. The 1982 Convention enabled all coastal states to extend their territories into the ocean and claim seabed resources such as oil and minerals as well as pelagic fish as national assets.²³ (See Figures 1–3.) Of course, many states do not have 200 nautical miles between them and their neighbors, which has caused considerable difficulties in establishing the borders of the new ocean territories. In fact, these maritime boundaries are so heavily contested that it was a significant challenge to obtain maps for reproduction in this volume, particularly ones that represent ocean space to scale. Figure 1, a map of maritime claims and the worldwide EEZ, illustrates the dramatic ways in which all nation-states have expanded into the ocean in the past twenty-five years. Figure 2, reflecting the EEZ of the United States and its Pacific Island territories, demonstrates the vast and strategic stretches of Oceania controlled by the U.S. Navy. Figure 3, of the EEZ in the Pacific Islands, provides an excellent visual representation of the ways in which a “sea of islands” may literally expand its terrestrial borders, remapping what otherwise might be dismissed as insignificant “dots” on the globe or, as Charles de Gaulle described the Caribbean, “specks of dust” (quoted in Glissant, 1989, n.p.). While on the one hand legislators were forced to recognize the




FIGURE 1. Maritime Claims and Worldwide Exclusive Economic Zones. Courtesy of Judith Fenwick.




FIGURE 2. U.S. Exclusive Economic Zones.

fluidity of the earth's only ocean and abandon the myth of seven seas, on the other hand the scramble for the oceans fixed this fluid dynamic space to suit a new era of maritime territorialism.

Pardo's vision for a shared global commons—an international governance that would ensure that 71 percent of the world's surface would not be polluted, exploited, armed with nuclear weapons, and pillaged of its biotic and mineral resources by industrialized nations—has certainly not been realized. The vast oceanic stretches of Micronesia, those areas even well beyond nuclearized Bikini and Enewetak, have been dumping grounds for U.S. toxic chemicals such as Agent Orange, dioxins, and nuclear radiation (Van Dyke 1993b, 221), a poignant reminder that the Latin for *vastus* signifies the ocean as well as waste. At least twenty-three naval nuclear reactors rest on the ocean floor, mainly from nuclear-powered submarines, while an additional fifty nuclear weapons have been reported lost at sea (Handler 1993, 420).

This is a dire time for our terraqueous globe, but the island writers discussed in this book have derived some hopeful models from ocean governance. First, in just the most material of terms, this radical remapping of the globe has greatly increased the political and economic viability of



FIGURE 3. 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zones of the Pacific. Courtesy of Center for Pacific Island Studies, University of Hawai'i, Manoa Mapworks.

many small island nations, not to mention their literal presence on the world map. Second, island writers have provided new ways to destabilize national and ethnic boundaries by drawing upon a transoceanic imaginary that reflects the origins of island cultures as well as their imbrication in the fluid trajectories of globalization. Reminding us of the irony that the Law of the Sea encouraged a territorialism over those marine areas where none existed before, Hau‘ofa turns to those other interpellations of the sea in which it is “an open and ever flowing reality,” envisioning the ocean, like Pardo, as “our waterway to each other” and a “route to the rest of the world” (1997, 143–144).

As a “Blue Revolution” (Borgese 1998, 14), this model of the ocean as common heritage reflects a new territorialism of the globe as well as a vision of its deterritorialism, making a vital yet unacknowledged contribution to the spatial configuration of diaspora, indigenous, and postcolonial studies. One of the primary ways the ocean can be deterritorialized is through the dialectic imagination of island literatures. Jamaican author Andrew Salkey is one of the few writers to take up the nuclearization of the seas in his hilarious short story collection, *Anancy, Traveller* (1992). His trickster spider-hero decides to solve this problem of “dread technology” (134) by confronting the ruling powers of the United States, the “Land of the Super-I,” a space of surveillance and hyperindividualism. To do so, Anancy “tief every scrap of *tonium*” held by the “Holocaust” office in “Washing Town” and in “all the other nukes countries” (19). Then he concocts a “ganja and mushroom tea” to get his military and political opponents “dreamy and nice, like them on the verge o’ making poem” (134). This allows him to “tief way the powers power” (129) from “them that don’t consider island people as real people, no how” (130). He hides these items in a bag at the bottom of an “ocean that see plenty, know plenty and hold secret tight as magnet” (11). Since “is only fish (he) can trust” (21), Anancy and his pelagic companions are the only ones to “know how sea bottom going save the world!” (21). Salkey’s text is a “Blue Revolution” of sorts, a reversal of the rendering of sea as waste that establishes a creative deterritorialism of the oceans through a localizing creole sensibility. He also marshals a different kind of submarine unity between islanders and their nonhuman allies in the seas. Of course, what Anancy and sea bottom do with all of this poisonous “tonium” remains outside the boundaries of the text—suitably, Salkey leaves the seabed unfathomed.

Other Caribbean allegories have not been so hopeful about the new territorialism of the seas and have questioned who benefits from the “Blue Revolution.” I would like to conclude this section by turning briefly to

INTRODUCTION

Ana Lydia Vega's short story, "Cloud Cover Caribbean" ("Encancaramblado") to demonstrate its engagement with these new models of oceanic territorialism, particularly the ways in which the United States has asserted maritime dominance in the region. This Puerto Rican text pinpoints U.S. imperialism as one of the obstacles to Caribbean regionalism and highlights the ways in which the lack of *national* sovereignty over the seas prevents *regional* belonging. Moreover, Vega parodies the construction of a masculine Caribbean regional identity through the objectification of women. Her work exemplifies some of the more troubling aspects of the new maritime territorialism and the way in which women's bodies function as aquatic metaphors while being excluded from regional participation. The publication of her collection in the same year as the 1982 Convention and her depiction of these "Stories of shipwreck" suggest a direct engagement with the colonial castaways of the past and the fate of contemporary "boat people" or *balseros* in the wake of contemporary models of ocean governance.

Vega opens her allegorical story with the protagonist Antenor escaping his home on a "makeshift vessel" on a "wretched sea adventure" that seems like a "pleasure cruise" compared to his experience of poverty, famine, and terror from the *tonton macoutes* in Haiti (1989, 106–107). In addition to its Trojan roots, Antenor's name is playfully drawn from the nineteenth-century Haitian anthropologist, diplomat, and pan-Caribbeanist, Joseph-Antenor Firmin, who had argued presciently for the equality of the races in an era of biological determinism and called for an Antillean Federation half a century before it was attempted in the British West Indies. Antenor then rescues two separate victims of shipwreck, a Dominican and a Cuban, whose disdain for their black Haitian host and competitive behavior suggest the impossibility of a pan-Caribbean union. The failed allegory of Caribbean regionalism is placed in the context of colonial shipwreck narratives, in which Antenor plays "the discoverer while secretly wondering if the world really is round," who fears that he may plunge off the edge "into the fabled chasms of the monsters" (106). Antenor is unsurprised by the appearance of the "shipwrecked" Dominican, Diogenes, named after the Greek cynic thought to be a founder of cosmopolitanism. After having "established an international brotherhood of hunger, a solidarity of dreams," the two men are annoyed but unsurprised by the appearance of the Cuban Carmelo, who appears "beside the proverbial plank of the shipwrecked sailor" (107). Although the omniscient narrator switches between the linguistic and cultural registers of their nations, the three men spend much of their time fighting over food, rum, and women, indicating that

even Vega's narrative framework cannot contain the complexities of Caribbean (male) identity.

Vega places her story in the long colonial tradition of shipwreck and castaway narratives that mystified the process of European maritime expansion. Antenor's lack of knowledge about the contours of the earth and his fear of monsters aligns him with the founding navigator of the region, Columbus, who is invoked when Antenor determines that "Miami was as far off as China" (110). Yet the author undermines this patriarch's legacy by juxtaposing these fantastic fears alongside the more pressing terrors of famine and violence by the *macoutes*. This calls into question the models of ethnic diaspora upheld by Frouadian "people of the sea" by demonstrating the inability for contemporary "boat people" to effectively navigate or chart their own journeys on land or at sea. Far from being *aqua nullius*, the sea in Vega's story represents a trickster character, often rocking the boat and upsetting human relations. The sea is also described as an "ugly thing" and a "muscled arm," a metaphor that becomes clear when the men start fighting, capsize the boat, and are intercepted by an American ship. "The captain, an Aryan, Apollo-like seadog," has the men pulled on board and barks: "Get those niggers down there and let the spiks take care of them" (110). The refugees are led "to the ship's hold" (110). The Mediterranean grammar that Vega employs to categorize this seascape, such as Antenor, Diogenes, Apollo, and the confused cartographies of Columbus, evokes the ways in which the Aegean was used as a template for the mapping of the Caribbean, a space historian W. Adolphe Roberts once described as a "potent womb, our sea of destiny, the Mediterranean of the West" (1940, 19).

Fifty years after Roberts, Benítez-Rojo would also imagine the flows of the region in feminized terms, critiquing the capitalist project as "inseminating the Caribbean womb with the blood of Africa" (1992, 5). In Vega's "ship's hold," a clear reference to the middle passage and a new space for the Caribbean's primary export, human labor, the men encounter an altogether different mapping of the transoceanic imaginary. The Mediterranean model for naming the figures in this story (Diogenes was "a neoclassical baptismal flourish" 107) is juxtaposed to the men's interpellation into the colonial hierarchies of race ("niggers") and language ("spiks"). In the hold, the Dominican and Cuban men have the initial "pleasure of hearing their mother tongue spoken," which even the Haitian "welcomed" (110). But Vega dismantles regional identification based on language and critiques her own omnipotence as narrator when a "Puerto Rican voice growled through the gloom: 'If you want to feed your bellies here you're going to have to work, and I mean work. A gringo don't give nothing away. Not to

INTRODUCTION

40

his own mother”” (111). The “growling” aligns this anonymous vernacular voice with the Aryan “sea-dog” and homogenizes these diverse Caribbean migrants under the rubric of exploited labor. The denial of maternal identification (to motherland or mother tongue) is the price paid to the gate-keeper of the hold, the cost of their assimilation into the U.S. nation-state, metonymically represented by the Aryan ship. Read tidaectically, we can see that the gendering of the land/sea relationship is articulated in terms of a feminized motherland and a fluid Caribbean “womb.” In fact, the only moment the three bickering men had found common “ground” on the boat is when they spoke of the “internationally famous backsides of the island’s famous beauties” (109). As sexualized or maternal objects, women are invoked as the necessary symbolic background to the larger male theatre of national and regional identification. This gendered split between the regional/national is much like the rendering of the global/local, which positions “women and femininity as rooted, traditional, and charged with maintaining domestic continuity in the face of flux and instability caused by global movements that, explicitly or not, embody a quality of masculinity” (Freeman 2001, 1017). Like the concept of a woman in every port, this relation between roots and routes literalizes the sexual tidalectic between a cruder set of homonyms: “land, ho” and “seamen.”²⁴

Benítez-Rojo’s ideal that “the Peoples of the Sea (are) traveling together toward the infinite” (1992, 16) is complicated when we consider the limitations imposed on refugees and transoceanic voyagers. Had Antenor been without his Dominican and Cuban companions, his fate may have been radically different. Thanks to an interdiction agreement signed in 1981 between Ronald Reagan and Jean-Claude Duvalier, the United States agreed to intercept Haitian refugees coming by boat and forcibly return them to Haiti, an agreement that violated international law and the refugee interception provisions established by the Law of the Sea.²⁵ In the face of this history, Vega’s short story brilliantly adopts and then discards all the possible sites of identification for Caribbean “peoples of the sea”: from geopolitical status to masculinity, from linguistic affiliation to the coerced production of global capitalism. In 1962 C. L. R. James declared: “The Caribbean is now an American sea. Puerto Rico is its show piece” (1993, 308). Writing a year after the Reagan proclamation claimed 4 million square miles of the marine space of the continental United States and its island colonies (including Puerto Rico), Vega’s story highlights the ways in which the policies of colonial nation-states engage tidaectically with the fate of those adrift at sea.

As a “Blue Revolution,” the Law of the Sea continues to challenge our notions of time and space, in a continuing and necessary dialogue on ocean governance. As Hau‘ofa demonstrates, it is a model for an “oceanic identity [that] transcend[s] insularity,” but it cannot be interpreted without addressing territorial claims from the land. The “sea is our pathway to each other and to everyone else,” but utilizing metaphors of feminine fluidity often suppresses the violence of the crossing and erases the continual military surveillance of ocean space. It is only by addressing the violence alongside the ocean’s hopeful potentials that we might determine that “the sea is our most powerful metaphor, the ocean is in us” (Hau‘ofa 1997, 148).

Routes and Roots

In engaging the tidalectic relationship between the homonyms “routes” and “roots,” this study builds upon a body of cultural studies scholarship in an attempt to explore the nexus of time-space in postcolonial island literatures. Because this work destabilizes the national, ethnic, and even regional frameworks generally employed for literary study, it cannot take any of these parameters for granted. As such, it is a work concerned with metaphors of origins and belonging as well as their current political negotiations and even mystifications. My first chapter, “Middle Passages: Modernity and Creolization,” explores how the ocean functions as a metonymic history for the millions of Africans who were transported across the Atlantic. I outline a history of the ways in which British maritime expansion sought to render the vastness of ocean *space* into temporalized *place* through a system of cognitive and literal maps that ranged from nautical literature to the charting of longitude. Building upon the work of Atlantic historians and diaspora theorists, I turn to the chronotope of the transatlantic ship, exploring how the multiethnically constituted slave ships that crossed the Atlantic suggest a type of time-space compression prior to industrial modernity. I focus on John Hearne’s novel *The Sure Salvation* (1981), a fictionalization of the middle passage that suggests that if “space is a practiced place” (de Certeau 1984, 117), one may read a narrative “practice” of the Atlantic Ocean. In his revision of Herman Melville’s *Benito Cereno*, Hearne inscribes an illegal English slave ship in 1860, decades after abolition, symbolizing the failures of linear chronologies of progress. Moreover, his depiction of the ship’s stasis, its immobility and timelessness amidst a literal waste of feces, blood, vomit, and sperm that envelops the ship and the middle passage experience, immobilizes the telos of movement across space needed to render

INTRODUCTION

the progress of history. Consequently, *The Sure Salvation* renders the sea as history through the metaphor of the sea as waste. The corporeality of the ship, its workers, and its slaves emphasizes an embodied history and the ways in which the bourgeois racialization of dirt and pollution was constituted in the oceanic “waste” of Atlantic modernity.

In this exploration of the sea as a dynamic space of cultural, ontological, and historical origins, I build upon Glissant’s assertion that “the abyss is a tautology” in which the ocean signifies a “vast beginning . . . whose time is marked by these balls and chains gone green” (1997, 6). This beginning is linked to the creation of modern time through the Atlantic slave trade and the construction of longitude, which harnessed the fluidity of the ocean to homogenize the globe into universal time. In this chapter, the ocean is figuratively sounded as a space of black diaspora origins, a gesture that Caribbean writers share with Walcott to “harvest ancestral voices from [the] surf” (1986, 16) and to chart what the “historian cannot hear: the howls/of all the races that crossed the water” (285).

Chapter 2, “Vessels of the Pacific: An Ocean in the Blood,” examines how Pacific Island writers have mobilized precolonial seafaring routes as the historical roots to globalizing fluidity and flows. Inspired by Caribbean writers such as Walcott, and by the fact that the islands are literally growing through geological activity, scholars like Hau‘ofa have conceptualized the region as a dynamic “sea of islands,” connected by ancient and modern travelers. Because the transoceanic imagination employs the ship or voyaging canoe as a vessel that sustains regionalism, this chapter traces out a genealogy of Pacific vehicles of sovereignty, the Vaka Pasifika. To recover the voyaging canoe as a vessel of history, I begin with a discussion of how the region has become synonymous with the economic entity, Asia Pacific, and trace how the U.S. military fostered the myth of island isolation as part of its nuclearization and “scramble for the oceans” during the Cold War. Military-funded projects from Pacific anthropology to Thor Heyerdahl’s celebrated *Kon-Tiki* journey were able to justify these ideas of island isolation only by dismissing the histories of Polynesian seafaring that led to the settlement of every island in the largest ocean on the globe, and by replacing these historic routes with trajectories of Aryan migration.

After exploring the close relationship between the militarization of the Pacific and its epistemic by-products in anthropology and area studies, I turn to the revitalization of indigenous seafaring histories, evident in the 1976 voyage of the Hawaiian canoe *Hokule‘a* to Tahiti and visible in contemporary Pacific literatures. I explore how the concept of the vessel

shifts from its interpellation as empty basin to a corporeal metaphor of a people's genealogy, history, and sovereignty. In my exploration of Vincent Eri's novel *The Crocodile* and Tom Davis's *Vaka*, I demonstrate that like the grammar of diaspora, canoe metaphysics draw from fluid metaphors of kinship and blood. This chapter argues that narratives of Pacific voyaging reflect a complex discourse of indigenous diaspora or native routes that likens the fluidity of the maritime region to ethnic kinship, positioning the Pacific vaka as a vehicle of ancestral and global history and inscribing the "ocean in the blood." The concept of the vessel renders tidalectics visible—it is the principal way in which roots are connected to routes, and islands connected to the sea. Whether imagined as a voyaging canoe, a naval ship, a raft, or as ethnic blood, the vessel is integral to claims to sovereignty in the region.

In an era of globalization, travel remains a seductive concept that is positively coded along the lines of progress and innovation. It still remains questionable to what extent the shift from national to diasporic literary studies over the past two decades entails a self-reflexive and critical recognition of the contemporary economic, military, and material manifestations of global capitalism. Moreover, the ways in which these theories of travel and diaspora are racialized and gendered have not been fully explored. Although scholars have done much to deepen our understanding of migrancy, nomadology, and diaspora, many have overlooked the ways in which stability and rootedness are often conflated with stagnancy, indigeneity, and women. Mary Gordon has noted that literature in the Americas "connects females with stasis and death; males with movement and life" (1991, 17). Given the fact that the etymological root of diaspora is spore and sperm (Helmreich 1992, 243), it is not surprising that western literary narratives, as Eric Leed demonstrates, produce history through a masculine telos of the "spermatic journey." Building upon their insights, Janet Wolff has cogently argued that "just as practices and ideologies of *actual* travel operate to exclude or pathologize women, so the use of that vocabulary as metaphor necessarily produces androcentric tendencies in theory" (1992, 224). As Carole Boyce Davies points out, "It is not an accident that it happens to be men who are asserting the right to theory and travel" (1992, 45). Thus the first section of *Routes and Roots* is particularly attentive to the ways in which masculine travelers are positioned on a ship that is likened to the world, a homosocial rendering of the domestic realm without women. What are the consequences of valorizing a masculine shipboard community as a symbol of transnationalism, labor unity, or creolization? Who benefits from a

INTRODUCTION

discourse in which women are bounded to an archaic nation-state? How do women enter history when it is produced by a migrant community of men?

By raising these questions, the first section highlights the ways in which the concept of a feminine sea is a vital metaphor to generate and sustain the ideologies of masculine reproduction on the ship. With its similar grammar of feminized flows and fluidity, one can extend this to the discourse of globalization as well.²⁶ Yet this creates a paradox. “The notion of feminine identity as relational, fluid, and without clear boundaries seems more congruent with the perpetual mobility of travel than is the presumed solidity and objectivity of masculine identity” (Wolff 1992, 31–32). Yet it is precisely the *lack* of ego fluidity in dominant forms of masculinity that makes it necessary to feminize travel as fluidity. By associating women with regeneration and (pro)creation, metaphors of femininity become essential to a masculinist paradigm of travel discourse that pathologizes female travelers themselves. As I explain in the first chapter, the rigid hierarchy of the ship and the vast fluidity of the sea are mutually constitutive elements of the transoceanic imaginary. By extension, the contained boundaries of the masculine subject operate in contradistinction to the vast fluidity of the feminized sea. The ship and the sea are necessarily gendered female so that a contained group of male travelers, a homosocial community, may maintain a heterosexual dialectic associated with ocean space. Interestingly, the ship has not always been conceived as an exclusively masculine community contained by a feminized vessel; in England the term for ship was initially understood as male (Kemp, 1976, 780). Only in the sixteenth century was the ship attributed with feminine qualities and figureheads, and while we understand it as a homosocial space, it was as late as 1840 that women were banned from living aboard docked British Naval ships (Kemp 302, 800). The phrase “show” or “shake a leg” derives from the need to differentiate sailors from their female companions in the hammocks aboard ship (Kemp 800), while a “son of a gun” refers to the birth of (male) children on the gundecks of British Naval ships (Kemp 816). In most of the novels discussed in this section, actual women are not imagined on the ship, but as in Vega’s story, symbols of femininity are vital to sustain the men’s receptivity to intercultural contact and to maintain their mobile structure of the domestic. In other words, a symbolic grammar of feminized vessels and flows enables the homosocial community on the ship to maintain porous social boundaries and to reproduce, both narratively and as agents of history. If, as C. L. R. James asserts: “the ship is only a miniature of the world

in which we live" (1978, 79), this suggests that the transoceanic imagination may reflect the gendered spatial logic of the nation-state.²⁷

Although the transoceanic focus of the first section of this book seems to privilege routes, my examination of these literary works demonstrates that the discourse of diaspora is constituted in relation to the stabilizing notions of femininity, nation, and indigeneity. This is why it is crucial that we engage a tidalectic between land and sea, examining how indigenous narratives and epistemologies are essential to the constitution of dominant productions of diaspora. This tidalectic helps to complicate theories such as Anthony Appiah's notion of "rooted cosmopolitanism" (1998), because genealogical roots, in indigenous communities, are vital to ontological and legal claims against the colonial nation-state. Since postcolonial theories have tended to celebrate nomadism and cosmopolitanism without always addressing domestic issues such as cultural and national sovereignty, the second section of *Routes and Roots* departs from watery trajectories to focus on indigenous cartographies, exploring how island novelists nativize the literary landscape.

This book not only makes the claim that postcolonial and diaspora studies have tended to displace indigenous discourses, it takes one step farther to argue that the valorization of "routes" is constituted by a dichotomous rendering of native "roots."²⁸ Chapter 3, "Dead Reckoning: National Genealogies in Aotearoa/New Zealand," discusses the ways in which June Mitchell's novel *Amokura* (1978) charts native genealogies—the legacy of the dead—by reconfiguring the narrative structures of novel and nation through the use of Maori spiral time. Like the concept of "moving islands," which draws upon an indigenous "time sense" (Lewis 1994, 120) charted across distance, the spiral is a trope that symbolizes a dynamic interrelation between the temporal and spatial. As such, this challenges theories of nationalism by revealing that indigenous practices of national belonging are far more layered and inclusive than diaspora theorists would let us believe. This chapter contributes to recent discussions in Pacific studies about native epistemologies by exploring genealogy or whakapapa in Aotearoa/New Zealand, defined as an ancestral and bodily inheritance, a "meta-physics" or corporeal history. Although Maori literature is not associated with the practice of diaspora, I explore how Mitchell's rendering of an internal migration in nineteenth-century Aotearoa/New Zealand complicates the tidalectic between indigeneity and dispersal and literalizes the definition of whakapapa as to layer. By drawing Mitchell's spiral genealogies alongside Keri Hulme's Booker Prize-winning novel, *the bone people*

INTRODUCTION

(1983), which also engages a rhizomatic layering of place, I foreground how Maori whakapapa is utilized as a paradigm of national settlement or native landfall. Ultimately, I define “dead reckoning” as an indigenous methodology that draws its foundation from the presence of the ancestors in the national landscape, rendering a literal body of history. Because Aotearoa/New Zealand, like many other islands in the Pacific, is understood to be a fish hauled from the sea by the demigod Maui, I explore how this concept of the pelagic or moving island complicates sedentary notions of land and soil.

“Adrift and Unmoored: Globalization and Urban Indigeneity” builds upon the previous chapter to chart how a fluid discourse of roots offers a model of native historiography in the destabilizing wake of the postmodern state. This chapter locates the process of globalization in the Pacific as vital to the unmooring of rural indigenous identities yet also crucial to the political consolidation of pan-tribal, regional, and urban sovereignty movements. I focus on Albert Wendt’s dystopic novel, *Black Rainbow* (1992), which depicts homeless indigenous peoples who must revitalize their genealogies to resist a global capitalist state that emphasizes the “ever-moving present” over a native past. The novel responds to an unprecedented shift in the Pacific in which the global privatization of state territories catalyzed native migration as well as sovereignty movements that reconfigured the production of local historiography. His protagonist must “confess” his history to the government tribunal in order to be accepted into the “ever-moving present” of the capitalist state. I read this as Wendt’s prescient warning about the ways in which historiography has become a lucrative business and an expanded domain of the state in the wake of land and resource claims submitted to the Waitangi Tribunal, an agency established to ensure the 1840 Treaty is honored. Depicting a protagonist of mixed heritage who attempts to sustain both family memory and national history, Wendt charts how Pacific diaspora might be usefully refashioned in terms of a creolized indigeneity that reflects global cosmopolitanism (routes) while maintaining genealogical continuity for land claims and sovereignty (roots).

Although Caribbean literary discourse has been traditionally mapped in terms of diaspora and “ex-isle,” my final chapter expands the parameters of discussion by addressing how indigenous presence is excavated as a trope of terrestrial historiography in the anglophone islands, particularly in Michelle Cliff’s *No Telephone to Heaven* (1987) and Merle Collins’s *The Colour of Forgetting* (1995). Because British colonists arrived in

the region after much of the indigenous population had been decimated, Carib and Arawak historical presence has not factored significantly in the anglophone Caribbean imagination until very recently. “Landfall: Carib and Arawak Sedimentation” investigates the ways in which writers such as Cliff, Collins, Jamaica Kincaid, and Wilson Harris have complicated the discourse of black nationalism to chart an indigenous Caribbean history in a dialogue with later arrivants. These efforts to localize and indigenize Caribbean history must be seen as a resistance to the ongoing pressures of outmigration from the region and as an effort to highlight the importance and viability of small island communities, or local roots in the wake of globalizing routes. They reflect a tidalectic engagement with routes and roots, upholding cultural creolization and offering a poetic corrective to materialist approaches to Caribbean historiography. Like Harris, Collins and Cliff forge complex alliances between African diaspora subjects and the traces of Carib and Arawak presence in their depictions of island colonization, with postcolonial nationalism inscribed as an ideal, but ultimately unattainable, landfall.

The title of this book, which borrows from James Clifford, highlights the central tenet of *Routes*: “Practices of displacement might emerge as *constitutive* of cultural meanings rather than as their simple transfer or extension” (1997, 3). As Davies observes, “Discourses of home and exile are central to any understanding of the politics of location” (1992, 20). The Caribbean and Pacific Islands I investigate here are characterized by a tidalectic engagement with settlement and migration. As I have discovered in the process of writing this book, the relationship between roots and routes is mutually constitutive and this can be imagined in historic and material terms. Writing about Vanuatu, anthropologist Joël Bonnemaison asks: “Can the tree, symbol of rootedness and stability, be reconciled with the canoe, symbol of unrestricted wandering?” (1994, 30). He determines that it can, since in that context the human is perceived as a rooted and fixed tree whereas the people represent a “canoe that follows ‘roads’ and explores the wide world” (30). Using seemingly contradictory terms such as “the land canoe” (43) and “territorial mobility” (48), Bonnemaison and other scholars have explained these indigenous spatial metaphors by emphasizing the profoundly circular patterns of both traditional and modern migration. Indigenous and diaspora epistemologies are crucial interests of this book, and the tree, a source of metaphysical roots and also a vehicle of transoceanic diaspora, represents that tidalectic crossing between space and time. This is why it’s no accident that the opening scene of Walcott’s

INTRODUCTION

epic poem *Omeros* depicts Caribbean trees as ancestral gods who must be felled in order for the Greek-inspired fishermen, Achille(s) and Hector, to fashion them into canoes and retrace their African routes to the sea. The transition from roots to routes suggests an imaginative return to origins in which “the logs gathered that thirst/for the sea which their own vined bodies were born with” (1990, 7). It is this tidialectic between land and sea, settlement and diaspora, that these postcolonial island literatures bring to the foreground, as we “catch the noise/of the surf lines,” of the “sea’s parchment atlas” (13).